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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,1853.
Accord and Satisfacetion.-In an action on a note and book account,
the affidavit of defence set forth that on the day the note became due the
plaintiffs agreed to accept in full satisfaction of both note and account, a
certain description of yarn, at a specified price, to be deliverd at a designated time and place; and that the yam had been ready for delivery
agreeably to the stipulation, and still was ready; but that the plaintiffs did
not come or send for it. HeZd, a good defence. Christie & Shaw vd. Craig
& Peterson. BLACK, C. J.; LEWIs, J. dissented.
Assumpsit-doney paid under Compukion.-One who pays without
objectionu, to the tax collector of a borough, taxes which are in part legal,
and in part illegal, cannot recover back the part illegally assessed. Borough of Allentown vs. &aeger. LowRiE, fJ.
Bill of Exchange--Affidavit of Defence.-The maker of an accommodation note cannot set up want of consideration as a defence against it in
the hands of a third person, though it be there merely as a collateral
security for an antecedent debt. An affidavit of defence in an action on
the note, therefore, which alleges no more than this, will be insufficient to
prevent judgment. Lord vs . The Ocean Bank. BiLcK, C. J.
Nor will it be sufficient in such case if the affidavit alleges that there
were other collateral securities more than sufficient to cover the debt, without the note; it must also show affirmatively that the securities have been
realized, and the debt extinguished. ibid.
Carrier-Billof Lading-Parol.Evidence.-In assumpsit against a
carrier, it appeared that the defendant's canal boat -in which the goods
were carried, was wrecked on the Pennsylvania Canal, by reason of an extraordinary flood; that the boat had started on its voyage with one lame
horse ; that by reason of this, great delay had been occasioned in making the
voyage; and that had it not been for this, the boat would have passed the
point where the accident occurred. .Held, that the accident was not the
ordinary or proximate result of the original negligence of the carrier, and
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that consequently he was not liable therefor.

3forrison vs. Davis & Co.

LOWRIE, J.

In cases of peril by extraordinary accident, the law requires of carriers
ordinary care, skill, or foresight, to avoid the consequences likely to
ensue. Ibid.
Though a bill of lading does not contain the usual exceptions' against
perils, &c., they areprimafacieto be implied. Ibid.
Where a bill of lading contained none of the usual exceptions, it was
held that oral testimony connected with advertisements and circulars of
the carrier, was admissible to show that the latter had agreed to insure the
safe delivery of the goods at all events and without exception; held, also,
that it was not necessary for the shipper to show that the advertisements
had come to his knowledge before the time of the delivery of the goods.
Ibid.
Where carriers agree also to insure the goods conveyed by them, there
is but one contract in all, and it should be declared on as such. Ibid.
Count .P hladelT pa- S u bscriptionto Railroad Stock.-In the absence
of special legislation a county is not authorized to borrow money for a
subscription to the stock of a railroad. Brown, Randal & al. vs. County
Commissicners. BLACK, C. J.
The 1st section of the Act of FebIuary 10, 1852, which provides
that the " constituted authorities of any municipal or other corporation"
may subscribe- to the Sunbury and Erie Railroad, does not authorize the
Commissioners of Philadelphia County to borrow money or levy a tax for
the purpose of such subscription, without the aid of the County Board.
Ibid.
The Acts of 1834 and 1836, with reference to the County Board are
constitutional, and in force. The 4th section of the Act of April 15th,
1834, does not repeal the Act of April 10th, 1834. Ibid.
Deed-Reservation out of Grant.-R. conveyed to K. a tract of land)
particularly described, with a clause in the deed in these words-' Excepting and forever reserving the liberty for the heirs and legal representatives of P. deceased, to dig, take and haul ALL the stone coal that is
or may hereafter be found on the above described tract." The heirs of
P. were entitled only to four-fifths of the coal, R. himself owning the
other fifth, held that none of the coal passed to K. Benson vs. The
Miner's Bank. WOODWARD, J.
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Easement- Way,-Adverse user.-The -use of a way over another's
land, whenever the party sees fit, without asking leave, and without objection, is an adverse user, which, if continued for more than twenty-one
years, will give a title by presumption of grant. The burden of proof
that the use of the easement was under some license, indulgence, or
special contract, inconsistent with a claim of right, lies on the owner of
the land. -Garrett vs. Jackson. BLACK, C. J.
Eguit1-lnjuntion- Commonwealth.-A bill in equity, on the part
of the Commonwealth, asking an injunction and receiver against a
Bridge Company, on the ground that it is misapplying its income, must be
signed by the Attorney General. If signed by private counsel merely,
and at the instance of a private informer, it will be dismissed. Commonweatth vs. Alleghany Bridge Co.

LowIE, J.

That the real relator is the Auditor General of the State is immaterial.
Ibid.
Error-Certiorari--Taxes.-Wherea
special jurisdictionis conferred by
statute in an inferior court, no appeal lies to the Supreme Court, unless
where expressly given; but the regularity of the proceeding may be
examined. Campbell vs. Schuylkill Co. BLACK, C. J.
The Supreme Court has no revisory power over the decision of the Common Pleas, under the Act of 1850, which gives an appeal to the latter
Court from the Commissioners, in the assessment of taxes. Where, however, in such a case, the Common Pleas had erroneously dismissed an
appeal, the Act of Assembly not authorizing such course, the Supreme
Court directed the appeal to be reinstated, and awarded a procedendo.
Ibid.
Under the Act of 1850, the Court of Common Pleas,.on an appeal
from the Commissioner , can only make a decree affirming or reducing the
assessment, or, in case of a do4ble assessment, striking out the one complained of; a decree dismissing the appeal, unless for irregularity or the
mode or time of entering it is erroneous. Ibid.
Evidence-- Witness-lnterest.-A witness who is executor and residuary legatee of his father, who had been assignee for creditors, of a person
under whom the defendant, in an action of trover for fixtures claimed the
property, and had sold it with the assent of the plaintiff, is not an incompetent witness for the defendant. Harlan vs. Harlan. BLACK,
C. T.
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Execution-1c Persons interested" to demand issue.-Only a judgment

or other lien creditor is a "person interested," who, under the , 7th Section of the Act of 1836, in regard to executions, is entitled to demand an
issue, or appeal from a decree of distribution. iSmith,vs. Reiff. WOODWARD, J.

,

Executor-Power of ,Sale.-Where a testator ordered that his'executor
should not sell more of his real estate within one year than would be
sufficient to pay his debts, and should not sell the balance until five years
after his death; a power of sale after the five years was held to be implied,
and an inquest of partition before the expiration of that time was set
aside. Palmer's Appeal. BLACK, C. J.
Fixture.-The machinery of a cotton mill is part of the realty, but it
may be detached by the agreement of the owner and lien creditors, and
converted into personalty, and if this be done, it does not pass with-the
freehold at a sheriff's sale. Harlan vs. Harlan. BLACK, C. J. See S.
0. 3 H. 513.
Husbandand Wife-S.parate Use-Limitatwns.-A trust for the sepa-

rate use of a married person, ceases on her becoming sole, and she is
then entitled to demand and receive from the trustee the corpus of the
estate. H7arrism v. Brolaskqy. LOWIE, J.
A trust foi the separate use of a married woman, of a definite sum of
money, with a power of disposition by will, and in default of appointment
to go to her representatives, becomes, on the death of the husband, an
ordinary debt in the hands of the trustee, liable to be barred by the
statute of limitations.-lb.
Husband and
fe-M.Aarried Woman's Act-Resulting T2ust.-Notwithstanding the Act of 1848, the husband is still entitled to the labor of
his wife, and the benefit of her industry and economy. Her earnings and
savings, not out of her separate estate, do not become her separate property,
but belong to her husband as before the Act. Raybold v. Raybold.
WOODWARD, J.

Therefore, where a husband purchased real estate with the earnings and
savings of a wife during coverture, it was held that there was no resulting
trust to the wife.-lb.
Insurance-ParticularAverage.-A separate valuation in a policy of

insurance of each parcel, bale or package of an article, is not equal to
a separate insurance of each parcel, bale or package. As where a ship-
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ment of cotton was insured thus: "1on deck 104 bales, valued at $50 a
bale." R ed, that the assured was not entitled to recover, under the
usual clause exempting the insurer from liability for particular average
under 5 per cent., for a total loss of four bales. Newlin v. North Amerc
Insurance Company.-BLACK, C. J. Affirming S. C., 11 P. L. (4 Am.

L. J.) 266.
Justice--Jurisdiction.-It is no objection to the jurisdiction of an
alderman, that a claim upon which suit is brought, was originally more
than $100, the plaintiff admitting payments which reduce it below that
sum. Herbert v. Conrad.
Mechanic's Lien.-A mechanic's lien was filed on the 8th of September,
1845, and a sci. fa. issued upon it on the 10th of December, in the same
year; the suit was not further proceeded in till July 31st, 1850, after
which there was a verdict for plaintiff, on 20th October, 1850. Held, that
the issuing of the sci. fa. within the five years, kept alive the lien.
Sweeny v. MGcettogan.-IiEwIs, J.
Mechanic's Liens-Apportioned laims.- -The mechanic's lien laws
recognize the filing of one lien against several houses, and the apportionment of the amount among them; but they do not define the cases in
which said joint lien is proper. In order to obtain such a definition, we
must resort to the analogy of other cases;. and the case of joint contracts
'requiring joint remedies, is an obvious one.
Here all the buildings were put up by the owner at one time and on
one lot, and the materials were furnished for them all jointly, and it was
entirely proper to make them the subject of one apportioned lien. Taylor
vs. Montgomery.-LowRiE, 3.
Presumptionof Payment.-The presumption of payment from lapse of
time, is not rebutted by the removal of the debtor into another State,
after the expiration of seven years, and his residing there for more than
twenty years. Kine v. Kline.-WooDwARD, J.
Presumption of Payment.-The presumption of payment of a specialty
cannot be rebutied except by evidence which will create a presumption
equally strong the other way. Therefore; a demand within the twenty
years, of the obligor on a sealed note, followed by a refusal on his part to
pay and an assertion that the claim had been paid, and that he could
prove it, is not sufficient for that purpose; nor it seems, would the mere
naked demand have been enough. Sellers v. .olman.-BL~cK, C. J.
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Practice-Affidavit of Defence.-Where a judgment has been taken for
so much of a claim as is admitted to be due in an affidavit of defence, and
the amount is paid, it is a bar to any further proceedings to recover the
balance of the claim. Brazier v. Bannivg.-BLAcK, C. J. 2U.'Kinney
1
v. .Mitchell,4 W. & S. 25, distinguished.
Practice-Affidavit of Defcnce.-Whcre a defendant is not informed of
the facts of the ease so as to enable him to swear to, or to form an opinion
with regard to them at the time, the time for filing an affidavit of defence
may be enlarged. Lord v. The Ocean Bank.-BLACK, C. J.
'Where the defence depends upon the consultation of books and papers
in the hands of the plaintiff, who refuses to permit an inspection of them,
it seems that the Court, if satisfied of this fact, may indefinitely suspend
the rule for judgmnt.-Ib.
Practice--Serviceof Writ-Death of Defendant.-Where a summons
is returned served, when it has not been, and the defendant hearing of it,
and endeavors to get the service quashed, and failing in this, appears to
the action, he cannot complain here. Smith v. Hewson.-LowIE, J.
It is not good cause to abate a writ that one of the defendants was dead
when the suit was brought. A plea in abatement goes to the declaration.
We do not grant oyer of the writ in order to raise such an objection.-lb.
Roads.-Under the general Road law of 1836, the report of the viewers
is to be made at the next term after their appointment. If for any sufficient reason it cannot be made, then the proper course is to apply to the
Court to continue the order, and to make it returnable to the next succeeding term. A report made and confirmed at a succeeding term, or an
adjourned Court, without such previous order, is irregular, and may be set
aside. Rtauffer's Apoeal.-WooDwtAD, 3T.
Suretl/-Stay of P:roceedings-Damages.-A.being indebted to B.,
gave the latter a bond and a mortgage on land in New Jersey. B. caused
judgment to be entered up on the bond in Pennsylvania, and took out
execution against personal property. E. the mother of B., in consideration that B. should stay proceedings for a year, gave to the latter her
bond, payable in that period. Before the expiration of the year, B. foreclosed the mortgage in New Jersey. The land was sold for a less price
than the amount of the mortgage debt, it was alleged, through the improper
conduct of B. In an action against E. on her bond, the jury found that
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the stay was only intended to apply to the proceedings in Pennsylvania.
Held, that the foreclosure of the mortgage was no answer to the suit on
the bond, and that the conduct of the plaintiff at the sale only furnished a
defence to the extent of the loss actually sustained thereby by E. Everly
vs. Rice. BLACK, C. J.
The surrender by a creditor of securities in his hands, is only a defence
.pro tanto to a surety.

ibid.

Townshl.-In proceedings to erect new townships, ,or change the limits
of old ones, an omission to give notice to the inhabitants is fatal. Case of
Norwegian Township. BLACK, C. J.
Trust-Purchase b1 crier at sale.-Where, on a sale by a constable, he

superintends the sale, and employs a crier merely as a substitute, the latter
is not precluded from bidding in the property for himself. Crook vs.
Williams. BLACK, (. J.

Even if the crier had been a trustee, the sale would have been voidable
only; and, the price of the goods being applied towards the satisfaction of
the debtof the plaintiff, the latter would have no right to interfere, there
being no actual fraud. -bid.
Trustees-Allowances.-Though trustees are, in general, allowed costs

out of the estate, yet, where a trustee has an interest of his own, separate
and independent of the trust, and brings the cestui que trust into court,
merely to have the question with regard to his separate interest determined,
he will be directed to pay the costs. Raybold vs. Rayblold. WoODWARD) J.
Vendor and endee-Set-off.-A creditor, who orders goods from his

debtor, which the latter owns, and has on hand to sell, is not bound to
accept a draft, in favor of a third party, for the price of the goods, and
may set off against th6 price the vendor's indebtedness, on the ground of
mutual dealings. But when a creditor sends his debtor into a distant
market, as his agent, to purchase goods on his account, and the debtor
executes the commission, the law implies a promise, on the part of the
creditor, to pay the seller of the goods in the usual course of business, and
he cannot set off against the price the indebtedness of his agent. The
Bank of Mobile vs.

e/f. WOODWARD, J.

Vendor-Aotice of trust.-The memoranda on the margin of the appearance and execution docket, naming the attorneys in the cause, are not so far
a part of the record, as to charge a purchaser of land, under a sheriff's yen-
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dee, with notice that such vendee'was the attorney of the plaintiff in the
execution, and therefore a trustee for him by constructive trust. Reed vs.
I
Bell. LOWRIE, J.
endor- Warranty-Evidence.-In an action for the breach of a warranty of a horse, which consisted of an alleged spavin, testimony of witnesses, who had seen the horse about the time of the sale in the defendant's possession, that the horse was not spavined, and did not go lame, is
admissible on the part of the defendant. Weaver vs. Kruntzman. WOODWARD, X.

Will-Improper influence-llusband and wife.-General bad treatment
or past threats by a husband, are no ground for impeaching a will made
by his wife in 1852. It must be also shown that the testatrix was coerced,
or at least influenced, to make the will by the bad treatment received.
Ryl.an vs. teMahon. WOODWARD, J.
Wills-Register.-Where, upon a caveat against admitting a testamentary writing to probate, the Register issues a precept to the Common
Pleas, directing an issue, the facts are to be tried in the latter Court, and
the Register's Court in such case has no jurisdiction. Daniel's Appeal.
LEwis, J.
Will-Devise- Vestng.-A testator gave to his two maiden sisters a
life estate in land, and then provided that, after their death, it should go
to his "then heirs at law, or their legal representatives, to them, their
heirs and assigns, forever." At the death of his sisters, his next of kin
were a brother's daughter, and the grandchildren of A., a sister, living at
his death, but who had died before the termination of the life estate.
Held, BLACK, 0. J., diss., that the devise had given to A. a vested interest in one-half, and that her grandchildren were entitled, as her " legal
representatives," to share to that extent, notwithstanding the 8th section
of the Act of 1833, prohibiting representation among collateral relations
after brothers' and sisters' children. Stock's Appeal.

Court of Appeal, Kentucky.

December, 1852.1

Trespass-Quwre, C1. Fr.-A person having the legal title to land,
I The following important abstracts have been obligingly furnished by a Judge of
the Court of Appeals.
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and the right to the immediate possession of it, cannot maintain an action
on the case against a wrong-doer, who enters thereon and commits a trespass; this action can only be maintained by the owner of a reversionary
interest, or a person who has a title to the land, but not the right to its
immediate possession. Nor can such a person maintain an action of trespass, because such an action can only be brought by one having the actual
possession of the land, upon which the wrongful entry has been made.
The want of remedy in such a case results from the negligence of the

owner in failing to take the actual possession of the land. Robertson vs.
Rodes.

Time-Erro .- The final decree was rendered on the 18th October,
1848, and the writ of error was sued out on the 18th October, 1851. The
defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. The time allowed by the
statute to sue out a writ of error is three years next after the final decree.
Held, that when time is to be computed from an act done, the day on
which the act was done must be included in the computation, because,
since there is no fraction in a day, the act relates to the first moment in
the day on which it was done; consequently, the day on which the decree
was rendered, must be included in the computation of the time limited;
and the three years had expired on the day previous to the one on which
the writ issued.

CAibs vs. Smith's Reirs.

.:artner.-As a surviving partner has a right to control and manage the
partnership effects, for the payment of the partnership debts and liabilities,
he can, when the assets are not sufficient for the payment of all the debts
of the firm, make an assignment, by which some of the creditors will
obtain a preference over others in the payment of their debts. The estate
of the dece sed partner is not injured by such an assignment; the liability
to which it will remain,subject being precisely the same, whether the assets
of the firm be applied to the payment of all the debts rateably, or to some
of them to the exclusion of others. The creditors have no lien upon the
assets of the firm, in the hands of the surviving partner, except such as
they derive through the administrator of the deceased partner, who has
only an equitable right to have the assets applied to the payment of the
debts, and not a right to have them applied in any particular manner,
which right is not affected or prejudiced by the assignment. Wilson vs.
Soyer.
City-Liability for injuries by mob.-The plaintiff sued the city, in its

corporate capacity, for an injury to her dwelling house, situated within the
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city limits, committed by a mob, who partially destroyed the property.
She alleged in her declaration, that the officers of the corporation had
knowledge of the existence and intentions of the mob, and negligently and
wilfully failed and refused to disperse it, or to render her any assistance to
protect her property from its illegal depradations.
It was decided, upon demurrer to the declaration, that the city, although
liable for an injury sustained by an individual, which had been occasioned
by a failure, upon the part of the corporation, to perform a direct and
positive duty prescribed by statute, and incident to its corporate capacity,
such as neglecting to keep the sewers and streets in repair, was not responsible either for the misfeasance or nonfeasance of its officers, unless the
delinquency was authorized by the corporation, and that, consequently, if
the plaintiff had been injured by the failure of the officers to perform their
duty, they were personally liable, hnd she should not look to the city for
redress. In cases where such a liability rested upon the city, it was
imposed by special legislation; and, inasmuch, as the charter of the city
of Lexington contained no provision subjecting her to responsibility for
injuries to private property, inflicted either by individuals or by a mob,
this action against the city could not be maintained. .Prathervs. City of
Lexington.
Powers- Trusts- Trustees.-When executors are constituted trustees,
and an estate is devised to them for certain purposes, they derive their
power from the will of the testator, and can perform any act which it
authorizes them to do. If, however, the executors refused to accept the
trust, a Court of Chancery will have it executed; but the trustee appointed
for that purpose derives his power from the Court, and not from the will,
and can only execute the trust so far as he has been empowered to do it
by the order appointing him. He may be authorized to execute it, in
part or in the whole, as the Court may deem best; his acts, however, have
to be regulated, not by the provisions of the will, but by the directions of
the Court which has undertaken the execution of the trust. Harris vs.
Jones' Heirs.
Creditors-Lien.-Althoughit is a general rule, that on the death of a
partner, whose individual estate is inadequate to the payment of his separate estate, parixassu, with the separate creditors; yet if, upon a settlement of the partnership accounts, there is a balance found due to the surviving partner, after all the firm assets have been exhausted, he will be

